Water Law Review
Volume 19

Issue 1

Article 14

9-1-2015

Gulf Restoration Network v. McCarthy, 783 F.3d 227 (5th Cir.
2015)
Stephen Klein

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/wlr

Custom Citation
Stephen Klein, Court Report, Gulf Restoration Network v. McCarthy, 783 F.3d 227 (5th Cir. 2015), 19 U.
Denv. Water L. Rev. 137 (2015).

This Court Report is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Denver Sturm College of Law at
Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Water Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

Issuec I

COURT REPORTS

For step two under Chevron, the Court contemplated both the legislative
history and whether the EPA made a "reasonable policy choice" in its interpretation of the phrase "total maximum daily load." In these considerations, the
Court concluded that because Congress used some of the language from the
EPA's rule, the EPA had a strong argument that Congress both agreed with the
EPA's TMDL definition and also aflirmatively incorporated the EPA's rule into
statute. In addition, the Court determined that the EPA's requirements concerning TMDLs, including allocating among different kinds of sources, establishing a timetable, and getting "reasonable assurance" from states that the
TMDLs would actually be implemented, were all reasonable. Therefore, the
Court held that the EPA made a reasonable and legitimate policy choice in
having these requirements.
Accordingly, the Court affirned the district court's opinion that the EPA
did not exceed its authority to regulate through the Chesapeake Bay TMDL
requirements.
Lnmna Giauque
UNTED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Gulf Restoration Network v. McCarthy, 783 F.3d 227 (5th Cir. 2015) (holding that: (i) the EPA's refusal to regulate pollution resembled a rejection of a
rulemaking petition, which is presumptively reviewable by the courts; (ii) the
Clean Water Act possesses sulficiently specific language to allow for judicial
review; and (iii) the EPA may refrain from making a necessity determination if
it uses the language of the Clean Water Act to explain its decision).
In July 2008, a group of nonprofit environmental organizations, led by the
Gulf' Restoration Network ("Network"), petitioned the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") to regulate the high levels of nitrogen and phosphorous
pollution that have entered waters in the Mississippi River Basin and created
what the petition called a "dead zone" in the northern Gulf of Mexico. The
EPA denied this petition, deciding that it could create more efficient regulations
by working cooperatively with the states. Network then filed suit in the United
States District Court, Eastern District of Louisiana, alleging that the EPA violated both the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") and the Clean Water Act
("CWA"). The relevant section of the CWA stipulates that the EPA can directly create water standards if: (i) the state-created standards do not satisfy the
requirements of the CWA; or (ii) the administrator decides that a new or improved standard is necessary. The district court ruled that the Supreme Court's
decision in Massachusetts v. EPA required the EPA to make the requested necessity determination before denying the petition, and the court remanded the
matter to the EPA to conduct such a determination. The EPA appealed the
decision to the United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit ("Court").
The Court began its inquiry by reviewing the district court's holding that it
possessed subject matter jurisdiction to review the EPA's action. Generally, the
United States government and its agencies possess sovereign immunity and are
not subject to civil actions unless they consent to suit. Congress waived this
immunity in the APA, which created a general presumption that the courts have
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the requisite jurisdiction to review final actions of an agency. The Court recognized two circumstances in which sovereign immunity remains: (i) when a statute prohibits judicial review; and (ii) when the agency action falls within the
agency's legal discretion. The Court found that the first circumstance did not
apply in this case, and that the second circumstance could only apply to agency
actions for which the applicable statute provides no "meaningful standard" of
review.

Before considering whether the CWA provided a meaningful standard of
review, the Court considered whether this type of agency action was categorically reviewable, presumptively reviewable, or presumptively unreviewable.
When an agency acts affirmatively, the courts apply a presumption of reviewability. Because the EPA decided not to act, the presumption depends on the
activity in question. If the EPA refused to perform a rulemakingfunction, then
the Court would consider the action presumptively reviewable,if the EPA refused to engage in an enforcement action, then the Court would consider the
action presumptively unreviewable. The Court declined to define the EPA's
action as categorically reviewable, as Network argued, and instead the Court
found that judicial review should only occur after careful review of the statute.
Next, to determine which presumption applied, the Court considered
whether the EPA's actions resembled denial of a rulemaking petition or an enforcement action. Due to the breadth of Network's request to regulate pollution, the Court held that the EPA's refusal to conduct such regulation aligned
with a denial of a rulemaking petition. The Court rejected the EPA's comparison to an issuance of a Notice of Deficiency ("NOD"), a mechanism of the
Clean Air Act that the Court held to be an enforcement action in its prior decision in Public Citizen, Inc. v. EPA. The Court distinguished the NOD as a
punitive measure to correct inadequate state measures. The Court turned to
the language of the CWA, which uses the word "or" to separate the EPA's
power to correct state inadequacies from its power to conduct a necessity determination. The Court found that this disjunctive indicates that the necessity determination does not require any finding of state inadequacies. The Court
noted that an action to correct state inadequacies would reflect an enforcement
action, but the necessity determination more closely resembles a rulemaking
feature. The Court also considered the consequences of noncompliance with
each measure: the EPA may sanction states for failure to correct inefficiencies
after the agency issues an NOD, but the CWA does not authorize the EPA to
impose any sanctions for noncompliance. Finally, the Court described the
CWA's general notification process, during which the EPA must prepare and
publish its proposed regulations. Unlike the sanctions following an NOD, this
general notification does not entail any direct notification to affected states. The
Court thus concluded that the EPA's refusal to make a necessity determination
resembled denial of a petition for rulemaking, not an enforcement action.
'Therefore, the action warrants a presumption of reviewability.
With this presumption in place, the Court then considered whether the
language of the CWA provided a "meaningful standard" to apply when reviewing a denial of a rulemaking petition. The Court turned to Massachusetts,in
which the Supreme Court ruled that the EPA may decline to exercise its rulemaking power by providing a reasonable explanation "grounded in" the language of the controlling statute, not merely a self-directed policy explanation.
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The Court then answered two questions: (i) whether the "necessity deternination" section of the CWA contains sufficiently specific language to allow judicial
review; and (ii) whether the EPA did, in fact, have the discretion to decide
against making a necessity determination.
First, the Court found the CWA to possess sufficiendy specific language;
the CWA dictated that water quality standards "shall be established taking into
consideration their use and value for public water supplies, propagation of fish
and wildlife, recreational purposes, and.. . use and value for navigation." The
specificity of these considerations provides the EPA with a basis for explanation,
thereby allowing for judicial review. The Court further concluded that the
"mandatory language" of these sections of the CWA suggests reviewability.
Courts have found provisions with discrefionuy and suggestive language, such
as the agency "may" regulate, to be unreviewable. However, the relevant sections of the CWA dictate that the Administrator "shall" create new standards
when necessary. Thus, the Court held that it possessed subject matter jurisdiction to review the EPA's action.
Second, the Court disagreed with the trial court's finding that the EPA
lacked discretionary authority to decline a necessity determination. The Court
revisited the ruling in Massachusets,holding that the case's "reasonable explanation" standard also applies to this section of the CWA. Mas'sachusets holding requires the district court to analyze the EPA's explanation and determine
whether the explanation reflects the language of the CWA. Noting the highly
deferential nature of this standard, the Court described the EPA's burden as
"slight".. Nevertheless, the Court ruled that the EPA must provide such an explanation to the district court to justify the agency's refusal.
Accordingly, the Court vacated the order of the district court and remanded
the case for proceedings consistent with its ruling.
Stephen Klein
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
Sierra Club, Inc. v. Bostick, 787 F.3d 1043 (10th Cir. 2015) (holding that
by issuing Nationwide Permit 12 and verifying that the construction of the
TransCanada pipeline was covered under the permit, the United States Army
Corps of Engineers did not violate the National Environmental Policy Act, the
Clean Water Act, or its own nationwide permit).
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") has the authority, under Section 404(e) of the Clean Water Act, to issue nationwide permits authorizing
activities that involve the discharge of dredged material into waters and wetlands.
The Corps issued a nationwide permit, Nationwide Permit 12 ("Permit"), which
permitted anyone to build utility lines in waters as long as the construction did
not result in a loss of greater than one-half acre of water for each single and
complete project.
TransCanada Corporation ("TransCanada"), sought to build the Gulf
Coast Pipeline ("Pipeline"), an oil pipeline which would cross 2,000 waterways
and expand across 485 miles. The Corps verified, in several letters, that the
Permit permitted construction of TransCanada's pipeline. Based off the Corp's

